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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Ry. Co. v. Turnipseed (1910), 219 U. S. 35. Nor is a statute which makes
the possession of a record of chances in a policy game prima facie evidence
of possession thereof knowingly. Adams v. New York (1904), 192 U. S.
585. See to the same effect Yee Hem v. United States (1925), 268 U. S.
179; Cockrill v. California, supra.
On the other hand, a statute was held unconstitutional which made a re-
fusal without cause to perform labor contracted for prima facie evidence
of an intent to defraud, the employee having received money which was not
refunded, where testimony by the accused employee in regard to uncom-
municated motives was inadmissible. Bailey v. Alabama, supra. See also
McFarland American Sugar Refining Co., supra. On the general question
see notes in 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1007; 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 226; and Ann.
Cas. 1912 A. 465. Since the legislature may create a presumption where
it did not exist before, it follows that the legislature may by repealing the
statute destroy the presumption. Virginia and West Virginia Coal Co. v.
Charles (1918), 254 F. 379.
In the principal case, the court ruled that there was not sufficient connec-
tion between the facts proved and that presumed. "Reasoning does not lead
from one to the other." The presumption of fraud was raised upon proof
of insolvency without regard to the facts from which the condition of in-
solvency resulted; and the statutory method of rebutting the presumption,
i. e., showing that the affairs of the bank had been "fairly and legally ad-
ministered" was considered to be too vague and indefinite. It would seem
that the decision is correct both on principle and authority.
J. N., '29.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTOXICATING LiQuons.-Louisiana Statute per-
mitting householders to make and have intoxicating liquor for home use
held constitutional. State v. Schweitzer (1928), 167 La. 81, 118 S. 699.
The case concerns itself chiefly with the equal protection clause of the
Federal Constitution, and the court holds that a denial of permission to make
and have intoxicating liquors to other than householders is not a denial of
equal protection.
The interesting point, however, is that the statute permits the making
and having of intoxicating liquors at all; its constitutionality with reference
to the Eighteenth Amendment is not questioned, but is taken for granted.
It is well-settled that the Eighteenth Amendment did not take away the
states' regulatory power over liquor, nor did it supersede state statutes on
the subject, unless they were contrary to the amendment. Powell v. State
(1921), 18 Ala. A. 101, 90 S. 138; Kappitz v. U. S. (1921), 272 F. 96;
State v. George (Mo. A., 1922), 243 S. W. 948, and cases cited therein.
Since the amendment limits its prohibition to the "manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors," it has been held in one case that
a state may not prohibit the possession of liquor lawfully obtained. Spomer
t. Curtis (1923), 85 Fla. 408, 96 S. 836. However, the general judicial
opinion is that the states may prohibit the possession of intoxicating liquors.
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Ewing v. State (1921), 18 Ala. A. 166, 90 S. 136; Edwards v. State
(1920), 150 Ga. 754, 105 S. E. 363; State v. Campbell (1921), 182 N. C.
911, 110 S. E. 86.
The language of the amendment prohibits manufacture. This Louisiana
statute permits manufacture for home use, i. e., "home-brew." It is an
interesting question whether the amendment may be construed so as to
permit the manufacture of "home-brew." In all cases where the state
has eflacted a prohibiting law (except Louisiana) there is no exception in
favor of "home-brew." It seems to the writer to be extremely doubtful
whether the general prohibition of the amendment is not being violated by
the Louisiana statute permitting the manufacture of "home-brew by house-
holds." The fact that there are few or no prosecutions for making "home-
brew" is no indication of the legality of such manufacture; it is a matter
of sufferance, tacit permission, but it implies no legality. M. E. C., '29.
CORPORATION - SERVICE OF PROCESS - SERVICE OF PARENT COMPANY
THROUGH SuBsiDiARY.A suit was brought for patent infringement, an
attempt being made to hold the General Motors Corporation liable for the
acts of its subsidiary corporations. The action was brought in Ohio, al-
though the General Motors Corporation is a Delaware corporation which
does no business in Ohio in its own name. However, the latter company
owned the capital stock of the subsidiary corporations which did business
in Ohio; and the advertising and annual reports of the General Motors
Corporation treated the subsidiary companies as mere divisions and ad-
juncts of the parent company. It was alleged that the holding company
controlled and directed the policies and business of the subsidiary companies.
Service was had on the managers of the subsidiary companies in Ohio in
behalf of the General Motors Corporation. On a motion to quash service,
held, that valid service had been made on an agent engaged in conducting
the business of the General Motors Corporation. Industrial Research Cor-
poration v. General Motors Corporation (1928), 29 F. (2d) 623.
A foreign corporation must be engaged in business within a state in order
to be validly served with process. Riverside Mills v. Menefee (1915), 237
U. S. 189. The mere fact that it operates through a subsidiary does not
necessarily subject the parent corporation to the jurisdiction of the state.
Proctor and Gamble v. Newton (1923), 289 F. 1013; Cannon Mfg. Co. v.
Cudahy Packing Co. (1925), 267 U. S. 333. The problem involved where
the presence of the subsidiary corporation in the state is asserted as a
basis of jurisdiction over the dominant corporation is entirely different
from that involved where one seeks to hold the parent corporation liable
for the debts, contracts.or torts of the subsidiary. Ballantine, Parent and
Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CAL. L. RV. 12. Thus, where a foreign
corporation marketed its products through a subsidiary which it com-
pletely dominated through stock ownership and otherwise, but which
maintained a distinct corporate entity, and which did not act as the agent
of the parent but instead bought the goods from the parent and sold them
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